Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis Revisit Moe and Colville by Minnis, Michael
American Indian Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 2
1-1-1991
Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes:
The Potawatomis Revisit Moe and Colville
Michael Minnis
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons,
Supreme Court of the United States Commons, Taxation-State and Local Commons, and the Tax
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Minnis, Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis Revisit Moe and Colville, 16 Am. Indian L. Rev. 289
(1991),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/2
JUDICIALLY-SUGGESTED HARASSMENT OF INDIAN




Pique over a 1975 Christmas party skit may have led to the
judiciary's quiet "repeal" of the Indian commerce clause. Ac-
cording to reporter Bob Woodward, Justice William Rehnquist
was responsible for a skit that apparently displeased Chief Justice
Warren Burger. Thus, in January 1976,
when the next assignment sheet came around, Rehn-
quist got only one case from Burger - an insignificant
[sic!] Indian tax dispute in Montana (Moe v. Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation).
Rehnquist had nothing but contempt for Indian
cases. Traditionally, [Justice William 0.] Douglas had
done more than his share. He had been the Court's
expert. With his own Arizona background, Rehnquist
was the logical replacement, but, he suspected that the
assignment was Burger's way of telling him what he
really thought of the Christmas party. Never one to
let an opportunity pass, Rehnquist turned an opinion
that was in favor of the Indians into an opinion that
indicated in most cases they would lose. It wiped away
decades of Douglas's opinions.'
This "insignificant" case was Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes,2 which completed the emasculation of the In-
dian commerce clause and initiated a frustrating new Indian
war. Since Moe Indian tribes throughout the United States have
been fighting an escalating battle against state taxing authorities
encouraged by this opinion.' In Moe the Supreme Court refused
a request by an Indian tribe for federal injunctive relief, after
* Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. J.D., 1969, University of Oklahoma
School of Law; B.A., 1966, University of Oklahoma. Minnis is president of Michael
Minnis & Associates, P.C., a firm that represents several Indian tribes, including the
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.
1. B. WOODWARD & S. AwrARONG, THE BRETHREN 412 (1979).
2. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).,
3. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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Montana had criminally prosecuted tribal members for selling
cigarettes to non-tribal members in Indian Country without a
state cigarette license and without collecting and remitting state
cigarette taxes.
4
We therefore agree with the District Court to the extent
that the "smoke shops" sell to those upon whom the
State has validly imposed a sales or excise tax with
respect to the article sold, States may require the
Indian proprietor simply to add the tax to the sales
price and thereby aid the State's collection and en-
forcement thereof.5
The Supreme Court has yet to identify the law that creates this
requirement, even though it reiterated and enlarged the mandate
requirement in Washington v. Confederated Tribes [Colville].6
States "require" persons to act by passing statutes. If the source
of the requirement "to add the tax to the sales price" is state
law, then a remedy for violation of that state's requirement
would be provided. If state law applies to Indians and Indian
tribes in Indian Country, states have no need for extralegal
remedies. The Supreme Court has created an untenable dichot-
omy.
The cigarette seller in Moe was a tribal member selling in
Indian Country. In Colville the Supreme Court sanctioned state
seizure of cigarette shipments bound for a tribe that was not
assisting Washington in collecting state taxes on tribal sales of
cigarettes to non-tribal members.7 Colville was a substantive
escalation of the Supreme Court's venture into federal Indian
policy. Among other things, Colville brushed aside a federal
law,8 found that a state could impose on a tribe unenforceable
4. The criminal prosecution portion of this case apparently only applies to states
(like Montana) that have been granted criminal jurisdiction over tribal members in
Indian Country. "Pursuant to P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, . . . the State of Montana assumed
complete criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over the Indians residing on the Flathead
Reservation." Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1306
(D. Mont. 1975) (footnote omitted).
5. Moe, 425 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added).
6. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). "[We] therefore hold that the State may validly require
the tribal smokeshops to affix tax stamps purchased from the State to individual packages
of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the Tribe." Id. at 159.
7. Id. at 161-62.
S. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988). This law authorized Indian tribes to adopt with federal
-approval ordinances regulating the sale of alcohol and tobacco. The Supreme Court
stated:
[W]e do not infer from the mere fact of federal approval of the Indian
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duties (to keep records on cigarette sales, collect, and remit state
cigarette taxes), and rejected federal injunctive relief against a
state if the tribe seeking the injunction failed to perform the
non-mandatory, state-imposed duties. 9 Instead of resolving a
tribal-state dispute, Moe and its progeny10 have greatly exacer-
bated it and have created a significant potential for physical
violence and even open hostilities. In Colville the Supreme Court
recognized Indian tribes as sovereigns, but suggested that states
could interdict commerce with an Indian tribe as a means to
force a tribal sovereign to cooperate in collecting state taxes."
The Supreme Court was given an opportunity recently to
reexamine this judicially-created war between Indian tribes and
states over cigarette taxes. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 2 the Oklahoma Tax
Commission (Commission) complained to the Supreme Court
that Colville granted states a right but not a remedy.' 3 In dicta
the Supreme Court responded to this lament by listing several
possible remedies which essentially reiterated that the Commis-
sion could lay siege to Indian Country until the tribe voluntarily
cooperated in collecting Oklahoma taxes.' 4 Finally, the Supreme
Court suggested that if these remedies prove unsatisfactory, the
Commission should seek relief from Congress. 5 Ironically, states
taxing ordinances, or from the fact that the Tribes exercise congressionally
sanctioned powers of self-government, that Congress has delegated the far-
reaching authority to pre-empt valid state sales and cigarette taxes otherwise
collectible from nonmembers of the Tribe.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
9. Id. at 155-56.
10. The third case in the original Moe trilogy was California State Bd. of Equali-
zation v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9 (1985) (per curiam) (injunction against
California requiring tribe to collect tax reversed because legal incidence of tax "falls on
the non-Indian consumers of cigarettes"). To date, none of the tribes in the Moe trilogy
are cooperating in collecting state cigarette taxes. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. City
Vending, No. 65,602, slip op. at 3 n.5 (Okla. Apr. 23, 1991) (WESTLAW, 1991 WL
67002, *16) (Kauger, J., concurring specially). The State of Washington, in particular,
has been active in honing its laws in a vain effort to create a remedy for the right to
require Indian tribes to collect state taxes. See, e.g., WAsH. R-v. CoDE ANN. §§
82.24.040, 82.24.050, 82.24.250 (Supp. 1991).
11. Id. at 161-62.
12. 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991).
13. Id. at 907.
14. Id. at 912.
15. During oral argument, the Oklahoma Tax Commission attorney responded to
this suggestion saying, "I believe Congress could do that [legislate a remedy for the
state] if it wanted to. It just doesn't want to.... I don't think many Congressmen
No. 2]
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probably did not seek congressional relief 6 because the Moe
decision apparently gave them - without legislation - a new
right.
The frustration of the Commission and other state taxing
authorities is understandable. The Supreme Court legislated a
right that states may require tribes to collect state tax on cigarette
sales to non-tribal members in Indian Country. The high court
has yet to legislate an effective remedy.
In Moe and its offspring the Supreme Court has legislated a
result consistent with how the Court perceives the parties should
act, rather than interpreting what the law prescribes.
Background
Until these relatively recent decisions by the Supreme Court,
the judiciary consistently held that Indian tribes in Indian Coun-
try were free from state control except to the extent authorized
by federal law. 17 This fundamental concept has a firm basis in
the United States Constitution, 8 in numerous treaties between
Indian tribes and the federal government, 19 and in several state
constitutions." Further, this tenet has an historical context:
"[The] people of the States where they [Indian tribes] are found
are often their deadliest enemies." 2 1 After all, those who created
Oklahoma out of Indian Country are the very persons who first
coveted and then pirated most of the Indian lands and rights.
The history of the Potawatomis is typical of the tribes moved
to Oklahoma. 22 They are a remnant of a vast Indian nation that
want to be put in a position faced with constituents who maybe feel differently about
the issue than the State does." Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the United
States Supreme Court at 40-41, Citizen Band Potawatomi (No. 89-1322). In other words,
because states cannot convince the legislature to pass laws, the federal judiciary should
do so.
16. See, e.g., id. at 40 ("I think it's amazing that the States haven't gone to
Congress ... .") (White, J.).
17. See Trade and Intercourse Acts, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790); ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139
(1802); ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574
(1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause); id. art. Il, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty
clause).
19. See, e.g., Treaty of Feb. 27, 1867, United States-Potawatomi Tribe, art. 3, 15
Stat. 531, 532.
20. See, e.g., OxLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
21. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
22. See, e.g., A. DE TOCQUEvILE, 1 DEMOCiACY IN AMERICA 328 (1965 ed.).
292
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inhabited most of the Great Lakes area for centuries until the
white man arrived. Like most Indian tribes, the Potawatomis
were pushed out of their native lands by the federal government
and marched to various reservations.
Faced with a choice between [white] settlers' demand
for the land and its promise to the Indians, the gov-
ernment took the predictable course. Often with the
use of military action, it forced many tribes to cede
their lands in exchange for money and a promise of
exclusive control over smaller areas called reserva-
tions.23
The removal of the Potawatomis to the lands west of the
Great Lakes was fraught with fraud and chaotic planning. The
Potawatomis were marched west under the supervision of greedy
political hacks who were often disinterested in the welfare of
their charges.24 "Scores fell by the wayside. Mothers carried
dead babies they could not bring themselves to abandon. In one
town so many people dropped from heat, exhaustion, lack of
water and proper food, if not from utter despondency, that a
doctor was called, and he found 300 'cases of sickness."'
Although the Potawatomis were pushed west in the late eight-
eenth century,26 they were not removed from their Great Lakes
homeland until the signing of the Treaty of Chicago in 1833.27
In nearly every one of its treaties, the Potawatomis were prom-
ised by the federal government that the new land established for
them would be theirs foreverl and free from state control. After
37 years of being moved from place to place as the white settlers
continued to push west, the Potawatomis were authorized by
23. V. DELORiA, JR., AMERIcAN INDIAN PoLicY xN THE TwE~NrMM CENTURY 50
(1985).
24. R. EDmUNDS, TE PoTAwATOmtS: KmEPRS OF TE Fm 272 (1978).
25. J. Tnmnn,' LAND GRAB - Tim TRUTH ABouT Tm Wn4No oF THE WEST 90
(1972).
26. See, e.g., Treaty of Greenville, Aug. 3, 1795, United States-Greenville Tribe,
7 Stat. 49; Treaty with the Potawatomi, July 18, 1815, United States-Potawatomi Tribe,
7 Stat. 123. The Potawatomis and the Chippewas possess more treaties than any other
Indian tribe in history. Lindquist, Indian Treaty Making, 26 CaRoNIcLES oF OKA. 416,
443 (1948).
27. See Treaty With the Chippewas, Etc., Sept. 26, 1833, 7 Stat. 431, 442, reprinted
in 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAiRS LAW AND TREATms 402 (1904). By these treaties the
Potawatomis ceded to the United States five million acres of land in Wisconsin, Illinois,
and Michigan.
28. Treaty With the Pottowautomie Nation, June 5 & 17, 1846, United States-
Potawatomi Nation, art. 4, 9 Stat. 853, 854 ("as their land and home forever").
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federal treaty to purchase 576,000 acres in Indian Territory29 for
the purpose of establishing a reservation. They accomplished
this purpose in 1870.30
Under the terms of the treaty which authorized creation of
the reservation, the Potawatomis were promised that their lands
"shall never be included in the jurisdiction of any state."' 3'
These promises have never been revoked and are implicitly
protected in the federal laws which authorized statehood for
Oklahoma 2 and in the Oklahoma Constitution.3
However, no sooner had the Potawatomi reservation been
established than the federal government began an allotment
policy. The ultimate purpose of this policy was to create surplus
land within the Indian reservations for white settlement. Over
the next 25 years, most of the Potawatomi land was reclaimed
by the federal government and sold profitably to white settlers.
4
29. At the time Indian Territory consisted of what is presently the State of Okla-
homa less the Panhandle. Potawatomis purchased their land from Seminole and Creek
Cessions for $199,796.08. Chapman, The Pottawatomie and Absentee Shawnee Reser-
vation, 24 CHRONICLES OF OKAHOMA 301 (1946). This purchase was pursuant to the
Treaty of Feb. 27, 1867, United States-Potawatomi Tribe, art. 2, 15 Stat. 531, 532.
30. See, e.g., U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Record Letters Sent, No. II, at 7
(Nov. 9, 1870). The original reservation included much of what is presently Pottawatomie
County, part of eastern Cleveland County, part of southeastern Oklahoma County, and
a fev acres of southwestern Lincoln County. See, e.g., HISTORICAL ATLAS OF OKLAHOMA
34, 50 (3d ed. 1986) (published by University of Oklahoma Press).
31. Treaty of Feb. 27, 1867, United States-Potawatomi Tribe, art. 3, 15 Stat. 531,
532.
32. See Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81; Act of June 16, 1906, ch.
3335, §§ 1 & 3, 34 Stat. 267; Proclamation No. 6869, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
33. See OKCLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 3; id. art. X, § 6.
34. See Act of May 23, 1872, ch. 206, 17 Stat. 159, reprinted in 4 C. KAPPLER,
INDLN AFFAIRS LAWS AND TRATIES 946 (1929). The Potawatomis are the only tribe
who purchased their reservation land. They purchased the land from Seminole and
Creek cessions for $119,790.75. See Chapman, supra note 29, at 305. It is not clear
that the Federal Government paid anything to the tribe when it took half of the
reservation lands. See Act of Sept. 18, 1891, 26 Stat. 1016, art. IV. The Indians were
paid $160,000 "for making homes and other improvements on the said allotments."
White settlers paid the federal government $1.50 per acre for the lands. I OKLAHOMA
STATE GAZETrE' AND Busniss DIRECTORY 56 (1898) [hereinafter OKLAHOMA STATE
GAZETrTE'] (compiled and published by G.W. McMillen). Cf. I G. LITTON, HISTORY OF
OrK,HOmA 396 (1957) ($1.25 per acre). The federal government also apparently paid
the Absentee Shawnees. The Absentee Shawnees were squatters on the Potawatomi
reservation lands. Prior to selling the land to the Potawatomis, the federal government
had temporarily placed the Absentee Shawnees on the Potawatomi reservation lands
pending ratification of a treaty that was never approved. The Absentee Shawnees were
paid some monies when a portion of the Potawatomi reservation was open to white
settlement. These payments to the Absentee Shawnees are in no way payments to the
Potawatomis for the land. The federal government tripled its money in, essentially, one
day from taking these Potawatomi lands. See OKL.AHOMA STATE GAZErrER, supra, at
56.
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The government allotted some of the Potawatomi land for
distribution to individual Indians, held some for the benefit of
the Potawatomis in general, and opened the surplus lands to
settlement by non-Indians. President Benjamin Harrison opened
about 265,000 acres in surplus lands within the Potawatomi
Reservations35 for settlement by non-Indians on September 22,
1891.36
Although this allotment policy disbursed and weakened the
tribe, the Potawatomis retained a presence within their original
reservation boundaries. In 1938 the Potawatomis organized a
tribal government under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.
37
Today the Potawatomis' tribal lands - exclusive of allotments
- consist of approximately 371 acres.
As long as the Potawatomis maintained themselves on the
welfare dole and the exercise of their sovereign rights did not
result in any substantial benefit to the tribe, Oklahoma essen-
tially ignored the tribe. This attitude changed when the Com-
mission - apparently encouraged by the Moe and Colville
decisions and by the increasing success of the Potawatomis in
governing themselves and making effective use of their tribal




Although the recent Supreme Court decisions speak of Indian
sovereignty as a mere "backdrop, ' 39 the real underpinnings for
35. The allotments of the Potawatomi reservation land were authorized in 1872.
See Act of May 23, 1872, ch. 206, 17 Stat. 159, reprinted in 4 C. KAPPimR, INDIAN
Aims LAws AN T EATnIs 946 (1927). The allotments actually began in 1875 and
continued for 15 years when (after passage of the Act of Feb. 8, 1887 (Dawes Act),
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388) the remaining reservation lands were allotted, held by the federal
government for use of the Potawatomis, or the "surplus" sold to white settlers. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1016. The approximate apportionment was
287,470.89 acres allotted, 510.63 acres held by the federal government, 22,653.55 acres
held for schools, and 265,241.93 "surplus" acres open for white settlement. OKLAHomA
STATE GAZETrER, supra note 34, at 56.
36. Proclamation No. 7 of 1891, 27 Stat. 989, 993 (1891), reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER,
INDIAN ArrAms LAws AN TxAnrms 949, 952 (2d ed. 1904).
37. Act of Sept. 18, 1891, 49 Stat. 1967 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-510
(1988)).
38. Technically, the original assessment was against the Chairman of the Business
Committee of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma in his individual
capacity. At the hearing on a preliminary injunction, the Commissioner withdrew the
assessment against the Chairman and reasserted it against the tribe. See Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 888 F.2d 1303, 1304 (10th Cir.
1989), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991).
39. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). "The
No. 2]
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this concept are laws, most particularly the United States Con-
stitution. Indians are mentioned twice and Indian tribes are
mentioned once in the U.S. Constitution:
(1) "Indians not taxed" 4 - The effect of this provision has
been largely mooted by subsequent events, i.e., Indians are now
taxed.41 However, this phrase has not been repealed. Thus,
apportionment would be affected if any "Indians not taxed"
still exist.
(2) "Congress shall have the power *** to regulate Commerce
with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes'"42 - The commerce clause was intended as a
recognition of federal supremacy over the commerce described
to preclude state interference. 43 However, commerce with Indian
tribes is treated differently from other (state or foreign) com-
merce.
Tribal sovereignty was implicitly recognized in federal relations
with Indian tribes. This recognition occurred both before and
after adoption of the Constitution. The two powers were gov-
erned by treaties, 44 that is by a "compact made between two or
more independent nations with a view to the public welfare.' '4
The Constitution empowers the executive to make treaties with
Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive reso-
lution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read." Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
40. "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states
... excluding Indians not taxed." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). This
phrase was repeated nearly 100 years later with the adoption of the U.S. CoNsr. amend.
XIV, §J 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to
their respective numbers ... excluding Indians not taxed.").
41. When the Constitution was adopted, most tribal Indians were not citizens and
not subject to federal or state legislation. See 57 Interior Dec. 195 (1940) (Indians not
taxed). Full citizenship for all Indians was not recognized until 1924. See Act of June
2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1988)) ("citizen"
includes "a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian ... or other
aboriginal tribe"). The codification is under title 8, "Aliens and Nationality." Indians
are now counted when apportioning the districts. See Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 118-
19 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., R. Knu, THE CoNsERvAnrv CoNsTrrTmoN (1990). "The federal
government's power to regulate commerce, a principal objective of the Framers, had
been meant to reduce barriers to trade among the several states." Id. at 175.
44. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886). Prior to 1871, the
federal government entered into 666 treaties with Indian tribes. See Marks v. United
States, 161 U.S. 297, 302 (1896). The Potawatomis are the most treatied tribe. See supra
text accompanying note 16.
45. BLACK's LAw DicnoNAY 1502 (6th ed. 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/2
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the advice and consent of the Senate.4 States are specifically
barred from making treaties.47 Although the Constitution was
not amended and tribes did not by treaty relinquish their sov-
ereignty, a rider to an appropriation bill in 1871 terminated
Indian treaty making.48 This rider was passed by an angered
House of Representatives that was excluded from making Indian
policy. 49 Implicit in the treaty-making power is that whatever
occurs in Indian Country must be the subject of voluntary
negotiation between the federal government and the Indian tribes.
Following the dubious repeal"' of the constitutional Indian treaty-
making power, courts began to discuss the federal government's
plenary authority over Indian tribes.-" This plenary authority is
in patent conflict with the Executive's exercise of the constitu-
tional Indian treaty power and with the commerce clause. If
Congress possesses plenary authority over Indian tribes, what is
the source of this power? The Constitution did not create an
omnipotent state, but rather a limited government. Congress
only has those powers specifically granted to it. A power to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes is limited, not plenary.
The same phrase is used to describe the power of Congress to
regulate commerce "with foreign nations. 5 2 Yet no one has
46. "He [the president] shall have Power, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2.
47. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10.
48. "No Indian nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty
." 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988).
49. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL INDiAN LAw 106-07 (1982 ed.).
50. The treaty-making power is constitutional. If relationships with Indian tribes
are to be negotiated by treaties, Congress cannot abrogate to itself the power to dictate
unilaterally to tribes by legislation. Thus, Congress has repealed the executive's power
to make treaties with Indian tribes. This repeal has also deprived tribes of the power
to negotiate the terms of their relationships. See W. CANBY, JR., AmmucAN INDIAN
LAW 88 (2d ed. 1988) ("As an attempt to limit by statute the President's constitutional
treaty-making power, the rider may well be invalid ..... "); McSloy, American Indians
and the Constitution: An Argument for Nationhood, 14 AM. IaDtAN L. Ray. 139, 156
n.91 (1989) ("The 1871 act arguably violated the separation of powers doctrine for it
eliminated the constitutionally enumerated power of the Executive to conclude treaties
by legislative act rather than by constitutional amendment."). Only two authorized
methods exist to repeal or amend the Constitution. See U.S. CoNsr. art. V. Neither
method sanctions repeal or amendment by the judiciary or by Congress.
51. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977).
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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suggested Congress has plenary power over foreign nations.
5 3
Moe and Colville Emasculate Indian Commerce Clause
The Indian commerce clause recognizes the exclusive federal
authority over commerce with Indian tribes.S Selling cigarettes
in Indian Country by a tribe to non-tribal members is patently
Indian commerce and thus a subject that the state - absent
federal authorization - should have no power to materially
burden.
In a recent book Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in
discussing the express grants of authority in the Constitution,
said, "Probably the most important of these powers granted to
Congress was the so-called 'Commerce Power,' which provided
that Congress should have the power 'to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states. .. ,,55
This partial quote of a very short clause from the Constitution
is indeed how the Supreme Court is now construing the com-
merce clause. The Indian commerce clause has been ellipsed56
by the judiciary.57 After Moe "[i]t can no longer be seriously
argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own force,
automatically bars all state taxation of matters significantly
53. Compare with Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192
(1989) ("W]hile the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free
trade among the states . . ., the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to
provid.e Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.").
54. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 282 (J. Madison) (1965 ed.). The
commerce clause was intended as a restraint "on the authority of the States." By
the commerce clause, the "States were, for practical purposes, forbidden to tax or
restrain interstate or foreign commerce." F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECULORUM
270 (1985).
55. W. RE.ENQUIST, Suraeam COURT: How IT WAs, How IT Is 116 (1987) (ellipsis
in original).
56. The full clause reads: "The Congress shall have the power ... to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes ....." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
57. According to Justice Rehnquist, only "discriminatory state action" is prohibited
by the Indian commerce clause. Thus, states may burden commerce "with the Indian
Tribes" with taxes or regulations, unless Congress has passed a law "pre-empting" the
"state taxing authority." Colville, 447 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the result in part, dissenting in part). Of course, Congress can pass laws
pre-empting state action whether the commerce clause existed or not. The original
presumption (states have no power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes) has been
reversed by judicial fiat.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/2
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touching the political and economic interests of the Tribes. ' 58
Moe resulted from the judicial evolution away from a legalistic
approach to Indian law and toward an amorphous pre-emption 9
balancing test premised on a backdrop. The statutes, treaties,
and the federal constitution that controlled Indian policy ceased
to be viewed as laws6° and began to be referred to as a backdrop.
Instead of deciding cases based on judicial principles of juris-
diction and law, cases were adjudicated on the basis of balancing61
the Indian interests with competing state interests. Predictably,
if any significant state interest is found, states nearly always
have a larger absolute interest that invariably prevails over the
smaller absolute Indian interest, even though the Indians' interest
may be geometrically greater in a relative sense.
62
58. Colville, 447 U.S. at 157 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 481 n.17). The Court explains
that the "taxes under consideration do not burden commerce that would exist on the
reservations without respect to the tax exemption." Id. This reasoning is circular. The
purpose of the commerce clause was to bar states from using taxes or regulations to
impede commerce "with Foreign Nations, among the States, and with the Indian Tribes."
Alexander Hamilton explained that this clause was intended to prevent "reprisals and
wars." "The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary
to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tribu-
tary .... Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York
for her [New York's] exclusive benefit?" Tim FEDERAusT No. 7 (A. Hamilton). This
truth also applies to Indian tribes that the states would render tributary.
59. "mhe trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a
bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption" McClanahan, 411
U.S. at 172. The laws have not changed, but the fashion or trend apparently has.
60. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
61. When the courts discuss balancing of rights, the discussion is often a prelude
to judicial legislation. The judges, not the legislature, determine the laws that govern
relationships when the result is based on judges' subjective determinations of what is
best (balanced). Although relying on a premise adverse to Indian tribes, Justice Rehnquist
articulated why this method is wrong: "Balancing of interests is not the appropriate
gauge for determining validity since it is that very balancing which we [sic] [the U.S.
Constitution?] have [has] reserved to Congress." Colville, 447 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
62. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57. The Indian cigarette sales and taxes on those
sales formed a significant portion of the tribal assets. However, the state interest in
collection of its cigarette taxes, though larger in absolute terms, was a relatively
insignificant portion of Washington taxes. As the dissent noted, tribes are required to
make a Hobson's choice: "tax sales to non-Indians" losing the sale and the tax or "not
taxing such sales" and likewise losing all tax revenue. Id. at 171 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Likewise, the Potawatomi cigarette sales and taxes are a significant source of tribal
income (19% in 89-90 fiscal year). Oklahoma cigarette taxes, on the other hand, have
since 1981 consistently been only two to three percent of state gross collections from
taxes, licenses, and fees. See OKJ.A. TAX C01A'N ANN. REP. (1989).
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For centuries state law did not penetrate Indian Country
absent federal authorization. "[The policy of leaving Indians
free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the
nation's history. "63 "[F]rom the very first days of our govern-
ment, the federal government has been permitting the Indians
largely to govern themselves, free from state interference."4
Nevertheless, in Moe and Colville the Supreme Court saw some-
thing it did not like, to-wit: Indians operating in Indian Com-
merce were not helping states collect cigarette taxes. In Colville
the basis for the Supreme Court policy was further defined: the
Supreme Court did not like the tribes "marketing a tax exemp-
tion." The Court did not believe principles of federal Indian
law authorized Indian tribes to market an exemption from state
taxation to citizens who would usually buy cigarettes elsewhere. 65
The Supreme Court has never explained why the "marketing of
a ta, exemption" practiced by virtually every non-Indian gov-
ernment,6 no matter how big or small - whether a city, town,
or hamlet - is improper when practiced by an Indian govern-
ment.6 The Supreme Court is looking at the effects of tribal
sovereignty - which are many - instead of focusing on law.
62.. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168, cited with approval in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. City Vending, No. 65,602, slip op. at 8 (Okla. Apr. 23, 1991) (WESTLAW, 1991
WL 67002, *6).
64.. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686-87
(1965).
65. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
66. Oklahoma and its political subdivisions constantly market tax exemptions.
Oklahoma just held a special session for the sole purpose of passing a law allowing
Oklahoma County to enact tax exemptions and credits to attract United Airlines to
locate a repair facility in Oklahoma County. See 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 1, 5-12; id.
ch. 2, 12-35.
67. An ethnic discrimination has often been behind Supreme Court Indian decisions:
Indians are inferior to other persons. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28, 39 (1913) (Indians are "essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.").
Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). "That opinion declared
first that Negroes, whether or not they were slaves, had been regarded as persons of
an inferior order ... " W. REHNQuisT, supra note 55, at 142. Indians were also
referenced as similar to Negroes. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403-04. This bias
may explain why tribes are not allowed to exercise governmental powers that every non-
Indian community in the United States routinely takes for granted, e.g., offering lower
taxes (Colville), prosecuting misdemeanors, or providing courts to resolve civil disputes.
See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) ("Indian Tribes
do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians" for
misdemeanors committed in Indian Country). See also Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053
(1990).
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The tribes are not offering a tax exemption. The tribes tax the
cigarettes themselves. 68 The exclusive power to tax transactions
occurring in a particular jurisdiction is an incident of sover-
eignty. The state is materially interfering with Indian commerce
by attempting to impose a tax on the commerce and is having
difficulty collecting that tax.
In reaching a result consistent with their prejudices, the Su-
preme Court established an unworkable anomaly. Thus, tribes
"should cooperate" with the state in collecting state taxes. If a
tribe does not cooperate, the judiciary will not protect the tribe
from the predations of the state. Unless a law compels it, why
should tribes collect and remit state taxes? In relinquishing
portions of their sovereignty to the federal government through
various treaties, the tribe bargained for the federal protection69
from the states. The judiciary is now slowly eroding this shield.
In Citizen Band Potawatomi the Supreme Court went even
further by suggesting possible state remedies when a tribe does
not cooperate in collecting state cigarette taxes. Because of tribal
sovereignty, 70 the Supreme Court recognized that states could
not tax tribes.7' Instead, states were essentially encouraged to
harass Indian tribes that did not follow inapplicable state laws.
Tribes have no statutory duty to- cooperate with the state in
collecting state taxes. Because the tribe is not legally obliged to
collect state taxes, the judiciary should not be suggesting ways
to force the tribe to do that which is not required by law.
68. See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 10,643 (1982). The Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of
Oklahoma adopted the General Revenue and Taxation Act of 1984. Section 202 of this
act levies a tax of eight cents per twenty cigarettes. This tax was preceded by the tribe's
ordinance regulating the sale and use of tobacco. Id. at 10,645.
69. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959) ("Through conquest and
treaties they [Indian tribes] were induced to give up complete independence ... in
exchange for federal protection . . . ."); see also Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware,
Chippewa, and Ottawa Nations, Jan. 21, 1785, United States-Wyandot, Delaware,
Chippewa, and Ottawa Nations, 7 Stat. 16.
70. Justice Stevens would eradicate sovereign immunity. "The doctrine of sovereign
immunity is founded upon an anachronistic fiction." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, III S. Ct. 905, 912 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens' dislike for the sovereign immunity doctrine is not limited to Indian
tribes but extends to "all governments - federal, state, and tribal." Id. at 912. In an
earlier opinion he explained the rationale for this opinion: "[C]hanges in our social
fabric favor limitation rather than expansion of sovereign immunity. The concept that
a sovereign can do no wrong and that citizens should be remediless in the face of its
abuses is more a relic of medieval thought than anything else." Pennhurst State School
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 164 n.48 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). If governments
have no immunity from suit, then judges become the sovereigns with absolute power.
71. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 908.
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A. central jurisdictional tenet of appellate courts is they only
decide issues tendered by the parties. Courts do not decide
hypothetical questions or attempt to resolve disputes not raised
by the litigants.7 2 In Citizen Band Potawatomi the Supreme
Court deviated from this basic tenet and in so doing deem-
phasized the rule's importance.
73
In Citizen Band Potawatomi only two basic questions were
before the Court. First, did the district court and the Tenth
Circuit err when granting and affirming the injunctive relief
sought by the tribe? Second, did the Tenth Circuit err when
reversing the district court order denying a motion to dismiss
the Commission's counterclaim? The Supreme Court found in
favor of the tribe on both issues. Ordinarily, this would have
disposed of the litigation. However, the Supreme Court went
further and reversed what may have been dicta in the Tenth
Circuit opinion concerning Public Law 280. 74 In addition, the
Supreme Court answered the Commission's lament about no
remedies. Again, such an answer was unnecessary because the
only issue was whether the remedy chosen by the Commission
- tax assessment of an Indian tribe - was proper. 75 Having
found that it was not proper, the Supreme Court had determined
the case.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made several suggestions as
to possible remedies that states could take when Indian tribes
do not cooperate in collecting "valid state taxes." ' 76 These sug-
72. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
73. In his recent book, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the Dred Scott case as
the classic, tragic example of an appellate court that unnecessarily decided issues. W.
REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 133-44 (citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 397 (1857)).
The unnecessary rulings made in this case had much to do with precipitating the Civil
War. "[I]t exacerbated rather than ameliorated the clash of opinion over slavery." Id.
at 143. Among the reasons for avoiding unnecessary dicta is that it is "seldom completely
investigated." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
74. "Neither Moe nor Colville depended upon the State's assertion of jurisdiction
under Public Law 280." Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 911-12.
75. Id. at 908.
76. The Supreme Court is imprecise when describing what gives validity to the state
taxes in Indian Country. One possible explanation may be that cigarette purchases by
non-tribal members who leave Indian Country are then subject to the cigarette tax
because the non-tribal buyers possess cigarettes in Oklahoma that do not bear Oklahoma
tax stamps. "[T]he competitive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on
tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers ... is dependent on the extent to
which the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax."
Moe, 425 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added). Of course, state efforts to collect a cigarette
tax from each individual buyer would be difficult. However, this difficulty is of no
legitimate concern to the Supreme Court.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/2
HARASSMENT OF INDIAN TRIBES
gested remedies included a new measure which was an expansion
on musings by the Solicitor General concerning possible state
actions against tribal officers. 7 Besides the fact that these sugges-
tions were unnecessary dicta, they imply that a proper function
of the Supreme Court is to gratuitously advise states on the
method or the procedure of collecting taxes. If states have a
problem collecting taxes, the remedy is a legislative one (either
by the state legislatures or by Congress). The solution is not a
judicially-created remedy. Further, the suggestions in Citizen
Band Potawatomi were not only unnecessary and inappropriate,
but also were so ambiguously articulated as to be very mislead-
ing.
Collecting Tax From Wholesalers
By Seizing Cigarette Shipments
"States may of course collect the sales [sic] tax from cigarette
wholesalers ... by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reser-
vation." s The cited authority for this suggested remedy is Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes [Colville].7 9 From the emphasized
phrase it can be inferred that seizure is solely a state remedy
against wholesalers. In Colville the State of Washington seized
shipments of cigarettes from a wholesaler "outside the state,
which are shipped directly to the respective Tribes by sealed
cargo trucks of Interstate Commerce licensed carriers." 80 The
district court granted Colville injunctive relief."' On direct appeal
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that injunctive relief was
not available where the tribes have "refused to fulfill collection
and remittance obligations which the state has validly im-
posed." 2 In Colville the following facts are important:
77. "[T]he Commission could bring an injunctive action in an appropriate court
to require tribal officers and the manager of the tribal store to collect and remit the
taxes." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19 n.17, Potawatomi (No. 89-
1322) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978). In addition, the
Native American Rights Fund filed a brief as amicus curiae in favor of the Potawatomi
position obliquely referring to suits against tribal officials. "Whether there is a third
remedy in the form of a suit against tribal officials for prospective injunctive relief is
an issue about which amici express no opinion, but do note that such recourse was not
even attempted by the State." Brief Amici Curiae of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of
Oklahoma, the Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribe of Texas, the United Indian Nations
of Oklahoma, in Support of Respondent at 11 n.6, Potawaiomi (No. 89-1322).
78. Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 912 (emphasis added).
79. 447 U.S. 134, 161-62 (1980).
80. Confederated Tribes v. Washington [Colville], 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1347 (E.D.
Wash. 1978).
81. Id. at 1362. ("The application of the State's tax has been preempted" by
federal law authorizing tribal sale of tobacco and "the State's cigarette taxing scheme
constitutes an interference with tribal self-government").
82. Washington v. Confederated Tribes [Colville], 447 U.S. 134, 161-62 (1980).
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(a) The wholesaler was from outside the state.
(b) The cigarettes seized were the property of the wholesaler,
i.e., the tribe had not yet purchased the cigarettes.
(c) The seizure occurred outside of Indian Country. "It is
significant that these seizures take place outside the reservation,
in locations where state power over Indian affairs is still con-
siderably more expansive than it is within reservation bounda-
ries.' '83
(di Washington had assessed the tribes for the unpaid cigarette
taxes prior to the seizure.M
(e) Washington had criminal jurisdiction within the Colville
Indian Reservation. 5
These last two distinctions are important because they may
have furnished the legal basis for the cigarette seizures. Under
the federal Constitution, 6 and under most state constitutions,
87
states are not authorized to search and seize private property
absent a valid warrant based on probable cause.
Federal law authorizes seizure of unstamped cigarettes as
contraband in interstate commerce. 8 These laws provide that
"contraband cigarettes means a quantity in excess of 60,000
cigarettes, which bear no evidence of the payment of applicable
state cigarette taxes in the State where such cigarettes are
found."8 9 This law does not apply to "a common or contract
carrier transporting the cigarettes under a proper bill of lading
or fireight bill which states the quantity, source, and destination
of such cigarettes."' 9 Further, the committee reports indicate
this legislation was not intended to cover cigarette sales to Indian
tribes.91
83. Id. at 162.
84. Confederated Tribes v. Washington [Colville], 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (E.D.
Wash. 1978).
85. Id. at 1348.
M6. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effecs, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
'warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV; see also id. amend. XIV.
87. E.g., OA. CoNsT. art. 2, § 30 ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, describing as particularly as may be the place to be searched and the person
or thing to be seized.").
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (1988).
139. Id. § 2341(2).
90. Id. § 2341(2)(B).
91. "The phrase 'applicable state cigarette tax' makes it clear that this legislation
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Taxing authorities in Washington state - where the Colville
Indian Tribe is located - have persuaded local federal author-
ities to seize several cigarette shipments bound for Indian tribes.
However, all attempts to date failed because the warrantless
searches were found to be without probable cause, even though
considerable circumstantial evidence existed that the drivers of
the vehicles seized were transporting unstamped cigarettes to
Indian tribes. 92
Interstate commerce is commerce moving from one state to
another. 93 Intrastate commerce is commerce within Oklahoma
that moves from a point in Oklahoma to another point in
Oklahoma. Ordinarily, states have no authority to seize ship-
ments in interstate commerce. 94 The same rule should apply to
Indian commerce, i.e., that states have no authority to interfere
with Indian commerce unless granted that authority by the
federal government. Before lawfully seizing intrastate contra-
band, Oklahoma must either obtain a warrant based on probable
cause or seize the material based upon a felony committed in
its presence.
Consistent with the commerce clause, Oklahoma allows un-
stamped cigarettes to be lawfully shipped into and through the
state. However, common carriers who ship unstamped cigarettes
to a place in Oklahoma must file written reports.95 Absent a
reciprocating licensing agreement with the shipper's state, Okla-
homa does not issue a license to a wholesaler who does not
maintain a place of business within Oklahoma. 96 Every retailer
is not intended to affect transportation or sale by Indians or Indian Tribes acting in
accordance with legally established rights." Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-575,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 5538 (emphasis added); see also Act
of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449, 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (97
Stat.) 4220.
92. See United States v. Simchen, No. 88-3199 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1989); United
States v. Swiger, No. 88-3200 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1989); United States v. Brown, No.
88-3201 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1989) (unpublished disposition of all three cases at 884 F.2d
1396 (aff'd 1989)) (text in WESTLAW).
93. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
94. Oklahoma implicitly admits as much: "The right of a common carrier in this
State to carry unstamped cigarettes, as defined in this Article, shall not be affected by
this Article." 68 OKLA. STAT. § 309(a) (1981).
95. Id. § 309(b).
96. 68 Oxu.A. STAT. § 304(a) (Supp. 1990). This requirement poses a problem for
Indian tribes that may want to assist Oklahoma in collecting cigarette taxes. The tribe
would have to concede, at least tacitly, that their Indian Country was in Oklahoma,
i.e., part of Oklahoma's territorial jurisdiction.
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who receives cigarettes from a wholesaler not required to secure
a license (i.e., non-Oklahoma wholesalers) is required to affix
an Oklahoma cigarette tax stamp to the cigarettes within seventy-
two hours of receipt. 97
Oklahoma is authorized to seize "[a]ll unstamped cigarettes
upon which taxes are imposed by this Article which shall be
found in the possession, custody or control of any person, for
the purpose of being ... transported from one place to another
in this State, for the purpose of evading" the Oklahoma cigarette
tax.9' Arguably, this statute does not authorize seizing shipments
in transit from a place in another state to a place in Indian
Country. Further, the seizure authorized by this statute is only
lawful if probable cause exists to believe that the cigarettes to
be seized are contraband, i.e., goods being transported in vio-
lation of the law. The Potawatomis, in selling cigarettes in Indian
Country to tribal members, are clearly not violating the law.
The Commission would need proof that the consignee tribe was
selling to non-tribal members. 9 Even sales by a tribe to non-
tribal members do not violate the laws of the State of Oklahoma
because those laws do not apply to Indian tribes. In addition,
Oklahoma must have probable cause to believe the driver is
violating a law before stopping the vehicle transporting the
cigarettes. Even if the stop is proper, Oklahoma cannot search
the vehicle without a warrant unless contraband is in plain
view.?° The seizure of interstate cigarette shipments bound for
Indiam tribes is fraught with considerably more complexities than
one could infer from the brief reference to Colville in the Citizen
Band Potawatomi opinion.
Collecting Tax From Wholesalers By Assessments'01
"[States may also collect the tax] by assessing wholesalers
who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores."' 1 2 The
97. 68 OKiA. STAT. § 305(b) (1981).
98. Id. § 305(d).
99. See Oklahoma v. Brooks, 763 P.2d 707 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (indictment
for selling unstamped cigarettes dismissed because no proof of sale to non-tribal mem-
bers).
100. See, e.g., Watt v. State, 487 P.2d 961 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Merwin v.
State, 277 P.2d 208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954) (arrest of driver for broken tail light did
not justify search of car and seizure of contraband liquor).
101. Shortly after the Potawatomi decision was announced, the Commission sent
letters to cigarette wholesalers throughout Oklahoma and the United States threatening
a tax assessment if the wholesalers sold cigarettes to Indian tribes located in Oklahoma.
These letters, particularly those to out-of-state wholesalers, are a crude - if not illegal
306
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cited authority for this suggested remedy is City Vending of
Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission.0 3 This case
merely holds that a company filing bankruptcy cannot defeat a
claim by a state taxing authority when the bankrupt entity has
not appealed from an adverse administrative finding that it owes
the disputed tax.'14 In fact, the tax assessment against City
Vending'0 5 was later struck down by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, relying partially on the Citizen Band Potawatomi deci-
sion.106
Sales to an Indian tribe are exempt from Oklahoma sales taxes
under an exemption for "Is]ales of tangible personal property
or services to the United States government."' 0 7 Similarly, the
cigarette tax does not apply to "all sales to the United States."'' 0
Whether cigarette sales to Indian tribes are exempt under this
statute from an Oklahoma cigarette tax has not been determined
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.' °9 It has merely been deter-
- use of state power. Further, the Commission sent letters to tribal officers ostensibly
seeking cooperation, but patently designed to intimidate and/or to create a predicate
for the new "remedy" suggested in Potawatomi (suits against tribal officials).
102. Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 912.
103. 898 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 75 (1990).
104. City Vending, 898 F.2d at 124-25.
105. City Vending was assessed twice for not remitting cigarette taxes on sales to
Indian tribes. The first assessment was for $83,511.83. See In re Cigarette Excise Tax,
No. P-85-151 (SC-85-002) (Okla. Tax Commission filed Sep. 3, 1985). City Vending
objected to the assessment because sales to Indian tribes were statutorily exempt or
alternatively in conflict with the commerce clause. The administrative law judge ruled
that the statutory exemption did not apply and that the "Commission is without
jurisdiction to determine the constitutional questions." Id. at Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendations 6 (Sep. 3, 1985). City Vending timely posted an appeal bond, but
never appealed possibly because it was served with a second assessment of $1,376,474.40.
See In re Protest of City Vending, No. P-86-117 (Okla. Tax Com'n. filed May 13,
1986) (order no. 86-05-13-02). Approximately 24% of this second assessment was for
the cigarette sales to the Potawatomis covered by the proposed assessment subsequently
barred in Potawatomi.
106. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. City Vending, No. 65,602, slip op. at 17 (Okla.
Apr. 23, 1991) (WESTLAW, 1991 WL 67002, *10) ("The Commission's order [assessing
taxes against City Vending] ... validates all taxes ... and therefore ... is void on its
face.") (emphasis added).
107. 68 OKuA. STAT. § 1356(A) (1981). "mhe Tribe itself not only is exempt from
payment of state sales taxes (such exemption is recognized and acknowledged by the
defendants [the Oklahoma Tax Commission] in pleadings to this Court) . . . ." Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, No. CIV-87-0338W (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 15, 1988) (order).
108. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 321 (1981).
109. In its recent City Vending opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed
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mined by an administrative law judge. Finally, City Vending
does not stand as authority for the proposition that the Com-
mission can assess a cigarette tax on wholesalers who sell ciga-
rettes to Indian tribes outside of Oklahoma."
0
Sue Tribal Officers for Damages
"We have never held that individual agents or the officers of
a tribe are not liable for damages in actions brought by the
State.""' The cited authority for this suggested remedy is Ex
parte Young." 2 This case authorized a mandamus action against
a state official; it did not authorize a suit for damages."' Ex
par'e Young recognized the federal power to enjoin state pro-
secutions only where they pose a threat to a right protected by
the federal Constitution." 4 Because of the dubious authority
cited and because the Court used a double negative ("never"
and "not"),1 5 the meaning of the dicta is ambiguous at best.
Exparte Young is the seminal case for one of the rare exceptions
to the rule that the federal judiciary cannot enjoin state action
because of the eleventh amendment." 6 It is a very narrow ex-
ception: "[I]n order to prevent irreparable damages to persons
and property the federal courts may restrain the legal officers
an appeal of the Commission's refusal to consider City Vending's constitutional objection
but did not discuss the claim to a statutory exemption. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. City
Vending, No. 65,602, slip op. at 7 (Okla. Apr. 23, 1991) (WESTLAW, 1991 WL 67002,
*4). "City Vending's entire argument rested on the federal constitution." Id.
110. During oral argument in Potawatomi, the Commission attorney admitted that
Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to tax wholesalers located outside of Oklahoma.
"If they don't have a presence within the state - if they merely ship on common
carrier to a certain location, they have - there's no sufficient nexus if they don't have
any trcks or warehouse or anything in Oklahoma, we can't make these other wholesalers
pay the tax." Official Transcript at 13, Potawatomi (No. 89-1322). However, the
Commission attorney added that the only way to enforce Oklahoma taxes against an
out-of-state wholesaler "would be seizures of the shiploads of cigarettes coming in."
Id. This assertion puzzled Justice Kennedy who said, "I don't see how you would have
authority to seize and not authority to require that the tax stamp be affixed." Id.
111. Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 912.
112. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
113. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154, 164-66 (1908).
114. Id. at 156.
115. Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 912.
116. Ex parte Young is an "exception to the Eleventh Amendment principle of
sovereign immunity." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 71 (1985). "The judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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of a state from taking proceedings in state court to enforce
State legislation alleged to be unconstitutional.' ' 17 Ex parte
Young "permitted suits against state officials to obtain pro-
spective relief against violations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ' 118 Although Ex parte Young has not been overruled, its
holding has been narrowed by subsequent decisions ' 9 and by
Congress which reacted by restricting federal injunctive power.'1
2
Until Ex parte Young, the court had been careful to
sustain the jurisdiction of the lower Federal Courts to
enjoin the enforcement of unconstitutional legislation
only after a finding of unconstitutionality, but Ex
parte Young abandoned this rule by holding that the
enforcement of a state's statute by the attorney general
of the state through proceedings in state courts could
be enjoined pending the determination of its consti-
tutionality.'
2 '
In any event the case authority referenced for the suggested
damage suit against tribal officials does not remotely support
the proposition.
As Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Yvonne Kauger recently
noted, this suggested remedy may be ephemeral because
the immunity afforded Indian Tribes is coextensive
with that of the United States. Albeit officials and
agents of Indian tribes do not have the same immunity
as the tribe itself, tribal immunity extends to such
persons when they act in their representative capacity
and within the scope of their authority.12
Another barrier to suing tribal officials for damages is, absent
federal authorization such as Public Law 280, states have no
117. ANNOTATED CONSTITIMON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 628 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1953) [hereinafter ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION].
118. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451 (1976).
119. See, e.g., Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("Since that decision
[Young], considerations of federalism have tempered the exercise of equitable
power .... "); Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25 (1984)
("The broad ultra vires theory enunciated in Exparte Young ... has been discarded....
The authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction that has been narrowly construed.").
120. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
121. ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, supra note 116, at 629-30.
122. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. City Vending, No. 65-602, slip op. at 12 (Okla.
April 23, 1991) (WESTLAW, 1991 WL 67002, *12) (Kauger, J., with Doolin, J.,
concurring specially) (footnote omitted).
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jurisdiction over acts by Indians in Indian Country. 23 The only
court that might have jurisdiction over a mandamus action
would be the tribal court.
Potaivatomi Case Blurred Indian/State Territorial Jurisdiction
Although the Supreme Court rejected the Indian commerce
clause as an impediment to state taxation of Indian commerce
in the Moe case, it has yet to address directly a substantive issue
necessarily implicated by its decision, to-wit: territorial jurisdic-
tion. The Court's decisions imply that states can validly impose
taxes on transactions that occur in Indian Country. This con-
clusion necessarily implies that the state has territorial jurisdic-
tion in Indian Country because the general rule consistently
applied is that "a State may not tax persons, property or
interests which are not within its 'territorial jurisdiction."" ' 124
This taxation includes sales taxes' 25 and means that the event
subject to the tax, i.e., the sale or transfer of possession, must
occur in the territory of the taxing authority.
The above concept is recognized in the Commission's stamp
excise tax law. 26 This doctrine can be illustrated by the following
analogy. Suppose Maine sought to compel Canada to collect
Maine taxes on sales in Canada. The minimal burden on Canada
to collect Maine taxes 27 would not give legal sanction to Maine's
efforts. Absent a treaty, states have no right to require Canada
or any other country or sovereign to collect Maine's taxes on
transactions in Canada. Likewise, states cannot expect other
states to be their tax collectors absent federal authorization. The
same should be true of state taxation in Indian Country, i.e.,
absent a federal statute giving states jurisdiction in Indian Coun-
123. See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 554 (1975).
124. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 138 (1937).
125. Florida "had no power or jurisdiction to levy and collect taxes on" transactions
occurxing outside 3-mile limit because it was beyond Florida territorial jurisdiction.
Straughn v. Kelly Boat Serv., 210 So. 2d 266, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
126. "There is hereby levied upon the sale ... of cigarettes within the State of
Oklakoma, a tax ...." 68 OsuA. STAT. § 302 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added); see
Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AmER.
IND. L. REv. 57 (1991). "'Within the limits of the state' or 'within the limits of the
United States' implies, wrongly, that Native Americans or their lands were or are within
the territorial boundaries, jurisdiction, or political boundaries of the state ... and thus
were or are subject to the ... territorial jurisdiction of the state .... " Id. at 72 n.53.
127. This standard is articulated in Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
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try, state laws and powers to tax should have no effect. 12
Territorial jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the taxing power.1
29
"The State cannot legislate effectively concerning matters be-
yond her jurisdiction and within territories subject only to con-
trol by the United States."' 30
The concept of jurisdiction is the cornerstone of common law
and constitutional jurisprudence. Jurisdiction confines the ex-
ercise of powers by governments only to those matters actually
committed to government and over which the government has
lawfully extended its powers.' 3' In a nutshell the question is: If
states have jurisdiction in Indian Country, what is the law giving
them that authority? The Solicitor General argued this question
in a brief filed in the Colville case.3 2 However, the majority in
Moe simply ignored this issue.'
In holding that the federal tobacco statute "cannot be said
to pre-empt Washington's sales and cigarette taxes,' 1 34 the Su-
preme Court implied the existence of state territorial jurisdiction
in Indian Country. Without jurisdiction in Indian Country, state
law does not exist to be pre-empted. 135 However, the source of
this presumed jurisdiction has never been defined. 36 Pre-emption
128. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980); Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
129. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342 (1954).
130. Standard Oil Co. v. People, 291 U.S. 242, 245 (1934).
131. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGiATE DIcTIoNARY 628 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1977).
132. See Brief for the United States at 22-23, Washington v. Confederated Tribes,
447 U.S. 134 (1979) (No. 78-630).
133. Justice Rehnquist alluded to the territorial jurisdiction question in his opinion
specially concurring and dissenting. "Here the State attempts to tax its citizens' use of
cigarettes purchased in a territory subject to the control of another sovereign [n.7 Indian
reservations are not of course subject to the exclusive control of the tribe. The Federal
Government and the States also have jurisdiction for some purposes.]." Colville, 447
U.S. at 181-82. No law is cited as the basis for the state jurisdiction, but the Colville
Tribe was subject to some state jurisdiction by virtue of Public Law 280. Justice
Rehnquist sanctioned the state's extra-territorial taxation effort because it was similar
to approved "use tax schemes." However, the use tax schemes do not require other
sovereigns to collect and remit use taxes. The taxpayer who resides in Oklahoma must
pay the use tax, not the seller in another state. See, e.g., 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1402 (Supp.
1990) ("There is hereby levied and there shall be paid by every person storing, using
or otherwise consuming, within this state ... .
134. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
135. Perhaps the answer is that the pre-emption concept has a unique definition
when applied to Indians. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. City Vending, No.
65,602, slip op. at 15 (Okla. Apr. 23, 1991) (WESTLAW, 1991 WL 67002, *9) ("Pre-
emption itself is a concept that, when used in the context of Indian Law, is not bound
by notions of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of law. White Mountain,
448 U.S. at 143." (emphasis added)).
136. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognizing the necessity for a legal basis for
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is a legal construct that applies only where two or more sover-
eigns have jurisdiction.
Thus, when the Potawatomis responded to the Oklahoma Tax
Commission's citation of the Moe trilogy, the tribe pointed out
that the only known source of possible state jurisdiction in the
Indian Country of the three tribes involved was Public Law
280.'17 The tribe further argued that a similar jurisdictional basis
did not exist in Oklahoma. 13 8 Although rejecting this possible
distinction, 3 9 the Supreme Court did not identify the law that
provided Oklahoma territorial jurisdiction in Potawatomi Indian
Country.
As articulated earlier, the consistent tenet of Indian affairs
based on law was that the states had no power in Indian Country
or over Indian tribes except that given them by the federal
government. Even the federal government's power was limited
to regulating commerce with the Indian tribes or exercising such
state jurisdiction in Indian Country posited a theory of residual jurisdiction. "If neither
preemption nor infringement is involved, then the test shifts from one of 'strict com-
pliance with PL-280' to the presence of state residuary powers." State ex rel. May v.
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 88 (Okla. 1985). The viability of this theory has
been questioned. See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. State ew rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709
(10th Cir. 1989).
Whether or not this theory [of 'residual' state jurisdiction] is tenable as a
matter of federal law, it addresses only the question of authority to regulate
the Tribes, not the question of tribal amenability to suit. To understand
it in the latter sense would be to give state courts jurisdiction when federal
courts lack it, a result completely contrary to the history of federal primacy
in the area of Indian law and policy.
Id. at 715 n.8.
137. In Chemehuevi, California was given limited criminal and civil jurisdiction over
all Indian Country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988); Colville, 447 U.S. at 164 n.32 ("The
Colville Tribe consented in 1965 to the State's assumption of jurisdiction .... "). The
Colville Tribe offered to come under state jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280.
WAsH. Ray. CODE ANN. §§ 37.12.010-.070 (1991); Tonasket v. State, 84 Wash.2d 164,
525 P.2d 744, 746 (1974) ("In January of 1965, the Colville Business Council issued
Resolution 1965-4 requesting that the State of Washington assume criminal and civil
jurisdiction over the Colville tribes and reservation .... [The government] issued a
proclamation assuming, on behalf of the state, the requested jurisdiction, which the
state has since exercised."). In Moe, Montana had assumed jurisdiction over Indian law
consistent with Public Law 280. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe,
392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1975). "Pursuant to P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 .... the State
of Montana assumed complete criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over Indians residing
on the Flathead reservation." Id. at 1306 (footnote omitted).
138. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 888 F.2d
1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 1989), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991)
("Oklahoma cites no federal law granting such jurisdiction.").
139. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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additional authority as could be obtained by negotiating a treaty
with the tribe. This general law is clearly and fully reflected in
the Potawatomi experience.
Oklahoma has long recognized that it possesses no jurisdiction
in Indian affairs because "federal jurisdiction of Indian lands
and affairs were reasserted in the acts of Congress organizing
the Oklahoma Territory and preparing the territory for state-
hood."' 140 This policy is reiterated in the federal government's
treaties with the Potawatomis and in the statutes authorizing
statehood for Oklahoma. In the treaty which authorized creation
of the Potawatomi reservation in Indian Territory, the U.S.
government promised 4' that the Potawatomi reservation lands
would "never be included within the jurisdiction of any state."
42
Although this promise has been indirectly and partially abro-
gated by subsequent federal enactments that removed much of
the Potawatomi reservation lands, it has not been revoked as
to those lands still held by the tribe.' 41 In setting the boundaries
of the Oklahoma Territory, and later in admitting Oklahoma to
the Union, the federal government consistently required an ac-
knowledgment that the new state would not exercise jurisdiction
in Indian Country. The Organic Act setting the territory's
boundaries stated
that nothing in this act shall be construed to impair
any right now pertaining to any Indians or Indian
Tribes in said territory under the laws, agreements and
treaties of the United States, or to impair the rights
of persons or property pertaining to said Indians, or
to affect the authority of the government of the United
States to make any regulation or to make any law
respecting said Indians, their lands, property or other
rights.' 44
140. 10 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 464-65 (1978).
141. "[An Indian] treaty was not a grant of rights to Indians,,but a grant of rights
from them - a reservation of those not granted." United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371, 381 (1905), quoted with approval in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327
n.24 (1978).
142. Treaty of Feb. 27, 1867, art. 3, United States-Potawatomi Tribe of Indians, 15
Stat. 531, 532 (emphasis added).
143. Although portions of a treaty may be repealed by implication, the treaty itself
is not repealed. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); EEOC
v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 938-39 (10th Cir. 1989); see also 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1988). "[N]o obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian
nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired." Id.
144. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81.
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In granting Oklahoma's statehood, the Enabling Act stated
that the people inhabiting said proposed state do agree
and declare that they forever disclaim all right and
title in or to ... all lands lying within said limits
owned or held by any Indian, tribe or nation and that
until the title to any such public lands shall have been
distinguished by the United States the same shall be
and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal and
control of the United States. 145
Oklahoma's Constitution follows the Organic and Enabling
Acts' 46 in recognizing that Oklahoma should not have jurisdic-
tion in Indian Country:
The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare
that they forever disclaim all right and title in or to
... all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by an Indian, tribe or nation ... The same shall be
and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal and
control of the United States. 47
As recently as 1978 the State of Oklahoma, through its chief
law officer, acknowledged this jurisdictional limitation: "It ap-
pears, then, from the face and legislative history of the Con-
gressional acts affecting Oklahoma, the Organic Act and Enabling
Act, that there was no intent to extend jurisdiction to Indians,
Indian Tribes, or Indian Country within the territories upon the
attainment of statehood. 't 48
"Article I, Section 3 of the Oklahoma Constitution constitutes
a legal impediment to the exercise of state court jurisdiction in
Indian Country." 4 9 The limitations imposed by article I, section
3 of the Oklahoma Constitution have been recognized in federal
court:
In the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma [article
I, section 3], . .. we find the following language:
145. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267.
146. "And Whereas, it appears that the said Constitution and government of the
proposed State of Oklahoma ... contains all of the six provisions expressly required
by Section 3 of the said act [Enabling Act] to be therein contained." Proclamation No.
6869, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
147. OKLA. CO ST. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added). Because of treaties and constitutional
disclaimers, "Congress has consistently acted upon the assumption that the States lacked
jurisdiction over Navajos living on the reservation." McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 175.
148. 10 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 464, 467 (1978) (emphasis added). Cf. DeCoteau v.
District Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975) ("It is common ground here that Indian conduct
occurring on the trust allotments is beyond the State's jurisdiction, being instead the
proper concern of tribal or federal authorities.")
149. State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263, 265 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); see also
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"The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare
that they forever disclaim all right and title in or to
any unappropriated public lands lying within the
boundaries thereof, * * * "
It is therefore apparent that the original Fort Sill
military reservation was never a part of, or under the
jurisdiction of, the Territory or State of Oklahoma
except as such jurisdiction has been specifically ceded
to the State by Congress. 5"
Although Yellow Cab concerned a federal installation on un-
appropriated public lands, the holding relies on the same clause
in the Oklahoma Constitution. That section includes lands owned
by Indian tribes.'5' Thus, the result should be the same for
Indian tribes, a result that, as previously noted, has been con-
sistently supported by the Attorney General for the State of
Oklahoma.
I A possible answer to the question of territorial jurisdiction is
that the Supreme Court implicitly concedes that Oklahoma has
no territorial jurisdiction in Indian Country but is concerned
that Oklahoma will have difficulty collecting its valid cigarette
taxes if tribes do not cooperate.
5 2
Conclusion
Because the judiciary has created an intolerable situation by
abdicating its responsibility to enforce laws and by ignoring the
exclusive constitutional prerogative of Congress to regulate
"Commerce... with Indian Tribes," Congress should promptly
C.M.G. v. State, 594 P.2d 798, 799 (Okla. 1979), cert. denied, Oklahoma v. C.M.G.,
444 U.S. 992 (1979).
150. Yellow Cab v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 594, 598-99 (W.D. Okla. 1942), aff'd,
137 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 321 U.S. 383 (1944) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 371 (1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 599
(1975) (a state cannot require out-of-state vendors to collect and remit state taxes on
liquor sold on federal military installations because "nothing occurs within the State
that gives it jurisdiction to regulate the initial wholesale transaction."). Compare Or-
ganized Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 69 (1962) (Alaska Constitution disclaimer clause
- enacted long after Oklahoma's and under vastly different circumstances - was not
a bar to concurrent state jurisdiction so long as tribal self-government remained intact.).
See also McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 167 (Arizona adopts similar interpretation of its
disclaimer clause).
151. O . CoNsr. art. I, § 3.
152. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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reassert its exclusive constitutional function by directing states
to leave Indian commerce alone except where specifically au-
thorized by federal law.
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Addendum
When the Supreme Court remanded Citizen Band Potawatomi
to the Tenth Circuit, the Commission urged reconsideration of
the Tenth Circuit order granting costs to the Potawatomis. 53
This motion was denied in an Order on Remand which was
entered on May 16, 1991.154
On remand to the district court the Commission argued over
the form of the judgment to be entered on remand 155 and
reargued costs. 156 The Potawatomis moved for sanctions. The
court denied the Commission's motions and the Potawatomi's
motion for sanctions.
5 7
153. See Oklahoma Tax Commission's Motion to Reassess Costs to Each Party,
Citizen Band Potawatomi Nos. 88-2160 & 88-2172.
154. Order on Remand, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 932 F.2d 1355 (10th Cir. Okla. 1991). "Cause is REMANDED to the District
Court to the dismissal of the Oklahoma Tax Commission's counter claim and entry of
an injunction prohibiting the Tax Commission from enforcing the challenged assessment
for previously uncollected taxes against the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma." Id.
155. See Defendants' Motion to Settle Judgment, Citizen Band Potawatomi, No.
CIV-87-0338-W (July 22, 1991).
156. See Motion to Reassess and Determine Costs, Citizen Band Potawatomi, No.
CIV-87-0338-W (May 23, 1991).
157. Order of Dismissal and Entry of Injunction, Citizen Band Potawatomi, No.
CIV-87-0338-W (July 31, 1991). The Order of Dismissal reads as follows:
Following receipt of the mandate issued by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit after its decision in Citizens Band Pota-
watomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 888
F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. Okla. 1989), the plaintiff moved for entry of judgment
consistent with the mandate. No opposition to this motion was filed and
the Court entered judgment on January 4, 1990.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted the defendants'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and, upon review, affirmed in part and
reversed in part the opinion of the Tenth Circuit. Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 111 S.
Ct. 905 (1991). On February 26, 1991, the case was remanded to the Tenth
Circuit.
On May 16, 1991, the Tenth Circuit in its Order on Remand stated that
'we affirm our previous decision except for that language in the opinion
that conflicts with the decision of the Supreme Court.' Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
932 F.2d 1355 (10th Cir. Okla. 1991). The matter was then remanded to
this Court with directions to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim and to
enter an injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the chal-
lenged assessment for previously uncollected taxes against the plaintiff.
The Judgment entered by this Court on January 4, 1990, dismissed the
defendants' counterclaim and enjoined the defendants from enforcing the
challenged assessment for previously uncollected taxes against plaintiff.
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Nevertheless, the Commission, on August 23, 1991, filed a
Notice of Appeal. The Commission alleges in its brief to the
Tenth Circuit that the district court order violated the Supreme
Court's mandate and, in a new argument, stated that an equity
court could impose the Commission's wishes. The Commission's
second argument requests the appellate court to direct the lower
court to act upon a legal argument which had never been before
any tribunal.
Thus, the Judgment of January 4, 1990, is consistent with the the Tenth
Circuit's Order on Remand of May 16, 1991. Therefore, this Court pur-
suant to the Order on Remand ADOPTS that portion of its Judgment of
January 4, 1990, and ADJUDGES that such portion shall remain and is
hereby in force and effect.
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